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Subliminal Song Lyrics as Product
Defects
I. Introduction
For many years, social scientific studies have indicated a signifi-
cant correlation between exposure to the media1 and subsequent
viewer behavior.' The effects of media choices pervade societal per-
ceptions and behavior and shape young minds in the process.' Mar-
shall McLuhan coined the phrase, "The medium is the message,"
referring to the phenomenon that the information source affects soci-
ety more than the actual information." Recently, McLuhan's famous
utterance and the reasoning behind it have become a focus of atten-
tion. This time, however, the arena is not 1960's pop culture but
subliminal suggestion.5
On December 23, 1985, James Vance, eighteen, and Raymond
Belknap, twenty, listened to the song "Better by you, Better than
me" on the Judas Priest album "Stained Class."'6 The boys chanted
the words "Just do it"' over and over again while listening to the
song. Thereafter, the boys barricaded themselves in Raymond's
room and violently destroyed a television and other items.9 The boys
exited the house by jumping through a window and went to a nearby
1. "Media" within the context of this comment refers to: television, radio, recorded mu-
sic, books, magazines, newspapers, games and all other published or broadcast information
sources.
2. David P. Phillips and John E. Hensley, Sex and Violence, Mass Media Stories on
Homicide, 34 J. COMM. 101 (1984) (Study charted the patterns of daily homicides in the
United States before and after prizefights, innocent verdicts, life sentences, death sentences
and executions and found that publicized punishments have a deterrent effect on homicides.).
3. Elizabeth D. McCarthy et al., Violence and Behavior Defects, 13 J. COMM. 71 (1975)
(Children who preferred violent television programs exhibited more aggression than those who
preferred more passive programming.).
4. Alden Whitman, Marshall McLuhan, Author, Dies; Declared 'Medium is the Mes-
sage', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1981, § 1, at 1 ("[A] medium is not something neutral - it does
something to people ... It massages them, it bumps them around."). See also EDWARD J.
WHETMORE, MEDIAMERICA 293-94 (1985) (explaining some of McLuhan's controversial media
theories). McLuhan characterized viewers as prisoners constantly bombarded with mediated
information that profoundly affected subsequent interpersonal interaction. Id.
5. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-3939 (2d Judicial Dist., Nev., Washoe
County Aug. 24, 1990).
6. Id. at 38.
7. The lyrics "Do it" do not appear in the "Stained Class" album, but plaintiffs alleged
that the words were present in the form of subliminal messages. Id. at 18.
8. Id. at 37.
9. Id.
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church playground with a sawed-off shotgun." ' Raymond put the
gun under his chin, fired the gun, and died instantly.11 James was
not as fortunate. James also put the gun under his chin and pulled
the trigger, but became grotesquely disfigured after the gun ac-
cidently knocked forward. 2 The bottom of James's face was com-
pletely blown off.1
3
The plaintiffs brought suit against Judas Priest and its record
company, alleging the existence of subliminal messages"4 on the rec-
ord album. Judge Jerry Carr Whitehead denied the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and held that the First Amendment
would not give the defendants blanket protection in this case. 15 In
the court's opinion, subliminals failed to "advance the purposes of
free speech" and violated the listeners' right to privacy.' 6 The court
characterized plaintiffs' claim for wrongful death in terms of inva-
sion of privacy, 7 a cause of action requiring proof that defendants
intended' 8 to commit the wrongful act.' 9 At trial., the plaintiffs failed
10. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-3939, at 38 (2d Judicial Dist., Nev., Washoe
County Aug. 24, 1990).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 38.
14. Subliminal messages are stimuli placed on media sources below the threshold of con-
sumer consciousness. Olivia Goodkin, Marueen Ann Phillips, Note, The Subconscious Taken
Captive, A Social-Ethical and Legal Analysis of Subliminal Communication Technology 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 1077 (1981). See also WHETMORE, supra note 4, at 272-78 (explaining the
role subliminal messages play in our culture). Subliminals first gained public attention when
James M. Vicary conducted a study in a New Jersey movie theater in 1957. WERNER SEVERIN
WITH JAMES W. TANKARD, COMMUNICATION THEORIES 129-30 (1988). Vicary flashed the sub-
liminal messages "Eat Popcorn" and "Drink Coca-Cola" on the movie screen during a show-
ing and claimed that the subliminal messages increased popcorn sales by 57.5% and cola sales
by 18.1%. Id. at 129.
15. Judge Whitehead included a section from the order denying summary judgment as
an appendix to his final opinion. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-3939, at 25 (2d Judi-
cial Dist., Nev., Washoe County Aug. 24, 1990) Part B: Are Subliminals Protected Speech?
[hereinafter Vance appendix].
16. The court reasoned that:
After giving careful consideration to the merits of this case, the court concludes
that the audio subliminal communications allegedly contained in the defendant's
music recordings are not entitled to First Amendment protection. The court ba-
ses this conclusion on three grounds. These are: (A) Subliminal Communication
does not advance any of the purposes of free speech, (B) an individual has a first
amendment right to be free from unwanted speech, and (C) the listeners right of
privacy outweighs the speaker's right of free speech when subliminal speech is
used.
Vance appendix, at 4.
17. Invasion of privacy "is said to consist of intentional interference with another's inter-
est in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or his private affairs or concerns." WILLIAM
L. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 854 (1984) (emphasis added).
18. It is unclear whether the court requires an intent to place subliminals on the record-
ing or an intent to cause listener suicide. See infra p. 9 and notes 99-110.
19. Vance, at 21.
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to demonstrate the requisite intent, and the defendants prevailed on
the merits.20
This comment explores the validity of bringing cases similar to
Vance under a theory of products liability, thereby eliminating intent
as a required element of a plaintiff's case. Part II reviews methods
previously used by plaintiffs who tried to bypass the First Amend-
ment in order to establish media liability. Part III analyzes three
tests which are employed to establish liability for product defects.
Part IV applies those tests for product defect liability to subliminal
song lyrics, demonstrating how the subliminal song lyrics render the
recording unreasonably dangerous and defective. This comment con-
cludes by demonstrating that a design defect claim is viable against
record manufacturers whose products contain subliminal messages,
notwithstanding a plaintiffs inability to prove intent to cause tor-
tious conduct.
II. History of Media Liability
A. Constitutional Exceptions to the First Amendment
Before the Vance ruling, there were only four categories of
speech that did not merit First Amendment protection: 2 obscenity,"2
fighting words, 23  defamation,2" and incitement.2 5  Plaintiffs who
20. It is interesting to note, however, that the intentional placement of subliminals on
the album could not be proved, partially because C.B.S. failed to produce the 24 track tape
that comprised the record. The court held: "The significance of the 24 track tape to plaintiffs'
discovery cannot be overstated . . . . Discovering and exposing these subliminal messages is
nearly impossible without reviewing the 24 track tape." Vance, Order Granting Sanctions, 4, 5
(filed 8/24/90). The court fined C.B.S. $40,000.00 in discovery sanctions "to deter any similar
future conduct and to compensate plaintiffs for expenses incurred due to the resultant delay
and other related expenses." Id. at 17.
21. DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I. 1982). See infra
p. 6 and notes 54-60.
22. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that a work is obscene if the
average person in the community would find that the work appeals to the prurient interest, the
work depicts or describes sexual conduct as defined by state law, and the work lacks literary,
artistic, political or scientific value). See also Skywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F.
Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (ruling that the album "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" by 2 Live
Crew was obscene).
23. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (stating that the test for
determining what speech constitutes fighting words is what a person of common intellect would
understand to prompt an average addressee to fight). But see Doe v. University of Michigan,
721 F. Supp. 852 (1989) (holding that a university policy on discriminatory harassment is an
unconstitutional limitation on free speech).
24. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a showing of actual
malice was necessary to warrant an award of damages for false statements). See also CLAR-
ENCE MORRIS, MODERN DEFAMATION LAW (1978). See generally Nicole Alexandra
LeBarbera, Note, The Art of Insinuation: Defamation by Implication, 58 FORDHAM L. REv.
677 (1990) (arguing that a more lenient standard should be applied in classifying defamatory
speech).
96 DICKINSoN LAW REVIEw FALL 1991
wished to establish media liability for acts of violence had to show
that a particular broadcast fit into one of the four categories of un-
protected speech. 6 This comment focuses on those cases in which
plaintiffs argued that the category of incitement applied.
The requirements for incitement were set forth by the Supreme
Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio.2 7 In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan
leader was convicted under an Ohio statute that prohibited any per-
son from advocating unlawful activity.28 The Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction and held that a state can only pro-
hibit speech which surpasses mere advocacy and reaches the level of
incitement.2 9 A plaintiff must show that the defendant's broadcast
was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and
[was] likely to produce such action."" ° Various cases have dealt with
this standard in attempting to place liability for acts of violence on
media broadcasters. 1
B. Attempts to Satisfy the Incitement Exception
1. Radio Liability for Incitement.-One of the few cases in
which a plaintiff has successfully satisfied the Brandenburg test and
proved incitement is Weirum v. RKO General."' In Weirum, a radio
station's contest to locate a disc jockey resulted in death when two
teenage drivers ran another driver off the road 'while they were pur-
suing the radio celebrity. 3 Plaintiffs filed a cause of action against
the radio station alleging negligence. 4 The court held that harm to
25. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See aiso Schenk v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
26. See DeFilippo v. N.B.C., 446 A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I. 1982).
27. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28. Id. at 446.
29. Id. at 448.
30. Id. at 447.
The Brandenburg decision requires a contextual analysis of every situation in
which speech might be punished and specifies two conditions that must be pre-
sent before a conviction for incitement can be upheld: The danger of lawless
action must be immediate and likely, and the speaker must have intended to
stimulate the illegal action.
Julie L. Dee, Media Accountability for Real-Life Violence: A Case of Negligence or Free
Speech, 37 J. COMM. 106, 108 (1987).
31. See Laura Fredericks, Note, Tort Law: Televiolence-hould Broadcasters Be Lia-
ble, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 897 (1984); Michael I. Spak, Note, Predictable Harm: Should
The Media be Liable, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1981). See generally Dee, supra note 30.
32. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
33. The two teenagers were each driving separate cars and listening to radio station
bulletins giving the disc jockey's location. One of the listener's car forced decedent's car onto
the center divider, overturning it. One of the drivers stopped to report the accident, but the
other driver continued driving and was able to locate the radio personality. Id. at 39.
34. Id.
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the decedent was a foreseeable result of the radio broadcast"' and
exempted the station from First Amendment protection." Because
the radio broadcasts prompted imminent lawless activity and the re-
sulting death was foreseeable, the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining
relief.3 7 The foreseeability of harm led to the imposition of a duty of
care, and the breach of the duty resulted in a determination of negli-
gence.3 8 The direct connection between the broadcasts, the resulting
injury, and the foreseeability of harm distinguish this case from most
other media cases.
2. Film Liability.-In two cases brought by plaintiffs against
movie companies that produced and released "gang films," the
causal link between broadcast and violence was not foreseeable
enough for a court to impose liability. 9 In Bill v. Superior Court of
San Francisco,"°  plaintiff sued the producers of the movie
"Boulevard Nights" when she was shot after attending a showing of
the film."' Her complaint alleged that the movie producers were neg-
ligent because they failed to warn the plaintiff that the movie's vio-
lent content was likely to attract boisterous members of the public
who carried weapons to the area surrounding the theater.42 More-
over, the plaintiff alleged that the producers were negligent in failing
to protect theater patrons, given the foreseeability that showing the
film would result in grave danger.'3
The court addressed First Amendment concerns, but based its
refusal to impose liability on common law grounds." Before deter-
35. "It was foreseeable that defendant's youthful listeners, finding the (cash] prize had
eluded them at one location, would race to arrive first at the next site and in their haste would
disregard the demands of highway safety." Id.
36. "The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely
because achieved by word, rather than by act." Id.
37. Weirum v. RKO General, 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 1975).
38. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
39. Bill v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 1989). See Dee, supra
note 30, at 113.
40. 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
41. Id. at 626.
42. The complaint alleged:
[P]etitioners "knew or should have known" that said movie was a violent movie
and would attract certain members of the public to view and movie who were
prone to violence and who carried weapons [and] would or were likely to "cause
grave bodily injury upon other members of the general public at or near the
showing of said movie."
Id.
43. Id.
44. [W]e refrain from deciding this case on First Amendment grounds alone, for
there may well be circumstances in which the state could hold a party responsi-
ble for warning, or taking protective action, against the foreseeable reaction of
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mining whether the harm was foreseeable, a threshold determination
of duty was necessary. 5 The court examined three factors and held
that no duty existed in this case. First, the producers had no special
relationship with the plaintiff which would give rise to a duty to
warn her of potential harm from a third party. '" Second, it would be
extremely difficult to predict what movies would prompt violence-
prone members of society into action.4 Finally, even if warnings
were imposed, they would be so general and so common that they
would be ineffective to prevent harm to the public.48
In Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,49 a film depicting
the violence of New York City street gangs allegedly caused the
death of a teenager. The decedent was fatally stabbed by a movie
patron who had just seen the film.60 Contrary to the court in Bill,
the court in Yakubowicz relied heavily on the First Amendment
when it decided to shield the movie producers from liability. The
court looked to "existing social values and customs, and to appropri-
ate social policy" 51 to determine whether the producers owed a duty
of care to the decedent.52 The court concluded that "defendants
could not properly be found to have violated their duty of reasonable
care by exercising protected rights of free speech."53 The plaintiff
failed to show that the film constituted incitement, and judgment
was rendered for defendants.5
persons to protected speech without violating the First Anendment. Rather, we
proceed to consider whether there exists a basis for liability on the part of peti-
tioners under established principles of common law ....
Id. at 630.
45. "Although foreseeability of harm is a primary consideration in determining duty and
is a question of fact for the jury, the threshold determination that a duty is owed plaintiff is
primarily a question of law." Bill v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 630
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (citation omitted).
46. See Davidson v. City of Westminister, 649 P.2d 894, 898 (Cal. 1982) (holding that
"a person's mere proximity to an assailant, even with knowledge of his assaultive tendencies or
status as a felon, does not establish a relation imposing a duty to control the assailant's con-
duct"). Based on Davidson, the court in Bill reasoned that the movie producers' alleged knowl-
edge that the film would attract violence-prone viewers failed to create a special relationship
with the plaintiff. See also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976) (Psychotherapist-patient relationship creates a duty to warn of potential harm.).
47. "We live, regrettably, in a violence-prone society, and predicting when, or where,
individuals or groups might react violently to the showing of a pari:icular movie is likely to be a
difficult matter, at best." Bill, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
48. "It seems unlikely that a volume of such warnings would contribute measurably to
the effective protection of the public." Id.
49. 536 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 1989). The title of the film was "The Warriors." Id.
50. Id. at 1070.
51. Id. at 1071.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. "Based on our viewing of the film, we conclude that no-thing in it constitutes unpro-
tected incitement . . . . Although the film is rife with violent scenes, it does not at any point
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3. Television Liability.-In DeFilippo v. N.B.C.,55 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court extended blanket protection to a media de-
fendant whose broadcast led to the accidental death of a viewer. A
guest stuntman on "The Tonight Show" pretended to hang host
Johnny Carson, who was unharmed by the stunt." The next morn-
ing, the DeFilippo's found their thirteen-year-old son, Nicky, "hang-
ing from a noose in front of the television, which was still on and
tuned to [the local NBC affiliate]."" The court rejected the plain-
tiff's claim on the basis that incitement cannot be measured pre-
cisely.58 Carson stressed the dangers of attempting the stunt at
home.59 Because Nicky was the only viewer to emulate the stunt,6 °
the court feared that permitting recovery for incitement would lead
to subsequent self-censorship by broadcasters.6"
In Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon,62 imitation of a
segment of "The Mickey Mouse Club" resulted in injury to a child.
The Georgia Supreme Court refused to extend liability after apply-
ing the "clear and present danger" test set forth in Schenk v. United
States.6" The broadcast included a demonstration to the audience of
exhort, urge, entreat, solicit, or overtly advocate or encourage unlawful or violent activity on
the part of viewers." Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures, 536 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Mass.
1989).
55. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
56. Id. at 1038.
57. Id. The issue here was not causation for it was clear that Nicky watched the broad-
cast and imitated the hanging. Instead, the court focused on whether the broadcast met the
requirements under the Brandenburg test for incitement. See Emily Campbell, Television Vio-
lence: Social Science vs. The Law, 10 Loy. ENT. L. REV. 413, 452 (1990).
58. DeFilippo, 446 A.2d at 1038.
59. The stuntman "stressed the dangers of performing the stunt, saying 'it's not some-
thing you want to go and try.'" Interestingly, plaintiffs tried to proceed on a theory of prod-
ucts liability, but the court rejected this attempt because the broadcast could not be considered
a product. Id. at 1038.
60. DeFilippo v. N.B.C., 446 A.2d 1036, 1038 (R.I. 1982).
61. The court stated:
In cases like the one at bar, claims must be weighed against two distinct First
Amendment rights that come into play. The more obvious of these is the First
Amendment right of the broadcasters . . . . The other set of First Amendment
rights belongs to the viewers and general public, whose rights are paramount and
supersede those of the broadcasters . . . . Using this balancing test, we find that
plaintiffs cannot overcome the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
Id. at 1039.
62. 276 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. 1981).
63. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Schenk test for speech outside of First Amendment protec-
tion preceded the now more commonly used Brandenburg test for incitement. The Supreme
Court in Schenk held that "[tihe question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
Id. at 52.
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how to create sound effects by putting a BB in a balloon. 4 The seg-
ment did not give rise to a "clear and present danger" a of injury;
therefore, it was constitutionally protected speech.86
The role of negligence in relation to the incitement exception
was clearly defined in Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Com-
pany.67 In Olivia N., a nine-year-old girl was "artificially raped"
with a bottle by two other minors at a beach in San Francisco. 8
Prior to the incident, N.B.C. had broadcast a television movie enti-
tled "Born Innocent," which depicted an adolescent girl being artifi-
cially raped with a plunger.69 Plaintiff alleged that the network was
negligent in broadcasting the film, because the film incited the vio-
lence causing plaintiff's injury
70
The court, however, held that the content of the film did not
constitute incitement under Brandenburg7 and thus refused to con-
sider the negligence issue. The court determined that incitement
and negligence were related as follows: "Where a television broad-
cast does not involve unprotected speech, the constitutional protec-
tion for free speech limits the state's power to award damages in a
negligence action based upon the broadcast. '7 a Thus, if the broad-
cast is not exempted from First Amendment protection under the
theory of incitement,74 the speech is protected and a negligence ac-
64. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 276 S.E.2d at 593.
65. "[U]nder First Amendment jurisprudence, (an) adult slould not be subjected to lia-
bility . . . unless what the adult invited the child to do presented a clear and present danger
that injury would in fact result." Id. at 593. Even though the invitation to make sound effects
could foreseeably result in injury, the risk fell short of a clear and present danger. Id.
66. "[C]ourts have refused to consider whether media weie (negligent) ruling instead
that unless the media were guilty of 'incitement' as defined by First Amendment law, they
were protected from liability." Juliet L. Dee, From Pure Speech to Dial a Porn: Negligence,
First Amendment Law and the Hierarchy of Protected Speech, at 1 (unpublished manuscript
available at University of Delaware, Department of Communication) [hereinafter Dee
Hierarchy).
67. 141 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
68. Id. at 512.
69. The film featured an adolescent girl who lived in a state-run home after having
become a ward of the state. Id. at 512. In one scene, the girl enters the community bathroom
to take a shower and is. accosted by four adolescent girls who "force her legs apart ... mak-
ing intense thrusting motions with the plumber's helper." Id.
70. Id.
71. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
72. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977).
73. Id. See also Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1.953) (holding that fictional
material communicated for primarily entertainment purposes is nonetheless entitled to First
Amendment protection).
74. Although incitement is the exception most often used by plaintiffs against media
defendants, obscenity, fighting words and defamation are equally sufficient to render the
speech unprotected. DeFilippo v. N.B.C., 446 A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I. 1982). See also Brian T.
v. Pacific Bell, 258 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (denying relief to a plaintiff whose
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tion cannot be brought successfully.
4. Magazine Liability.-In Herceg v. Hustler,75 the court held
that an article in Hustler Magazine did not constitute incitement.
Plaintiffs, whose decedent accidently hanged himself in response to
the article, were denied recovery against the magazine. 76 Plaintiffs'
decedent was a fourteen-year-old boy who attempted auto-erotic as-
phyxia as detailed in an article entitled "Orgasm of Death."77 Al-
though the article contained many warnings about the danger of the
practice, the boy attempted the technique and was found the next
morning, hanging nude in his closet, with a copy of the article near
his feet.78
The case was tried before a jury on the issue of incitement, 9
and plaintiffs were awarded monetary damages. 80 On appeal, how-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed.81 The jury's determination that the magazine article was the
proximate cause of death was irrelevant. 82 The article failed to meet
the criteria for incitement under Brandenburga and was constitu-
tionally protected speech.84
5. Liability for Subliminal Intoxication.-A novel claim of
molestation was allegedly spawned by a "Dial a Porn" telephone service). See also Dee, supra
note 66.
75. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1023.
77. Id. at 1019.
78. Id.
79. Although the case proceeded to the jury on a theory of incitement, the issue
presented was "whether the magazine article implicitly advocated the practice [of auto-erotic
asphyxia] it described or was likely to incite readers to attempt the procedure." Id. This test
refers more to proximate cause and less to imminent lawless action required by a Brandenburg
analysis. See Herceg v. Hustler, 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (lower court dismissed all
claims except incitement and allowed the case to proceed to a jury trial solely on this issue).
80. Diane Herceg, decedent's mother, was awarded $69,000 in actual damages and
$100,000 in exemplary damages. Andy V., a close friend of the decedent's, found the dead
body and was awarded $3,000 for pain and mental suffering and $10,000 in exemplary dam-
ages. Herceg v. Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987).
81. Id. at 1025.
82. Id. at 1022.
83. The test subsequently applied by the Court of Appeals was much more stringent
than the previous proximate cause test. The court held that under Brandenburg plaintiffs must
show that:
1.Auto erotic asphyxiation is a lawless act.
2.Hustler advocated this act.
3.Hustler's publication went even beyond "mere advocacy" and amounted to
incitement.
4.The incitement was directed to imminent action.
See id.
84. Id. at 1023.
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"complete subliminal intoxication" was brought against C.B.S.,
N.B.C. and A.B.C. in Zamora v. C.B.S." Plaintiff Zamora was fif-
teen years old when he shot and killed his elderly neighbor." The
complaint alleged that the defendant networks "breached a duty of
care" 87 to Zamora because they allowed the youth to become "de-
sensitized to violent behavior."88 Zamora charged that the networks'
broadcasts made him sociopathic and "a danger to himself and
others." 89
The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim,
refusing to impose such a broad duty on the media.90 It reasoned
that "[a] recognition of the 'cause' claimed by plaintiffs would pro-
vide no recognizable standard for the television industry to follow.
The impositions pregnant in such a standard are awesome to fol-
low." 91 The crux of the court's objection was that the plaintiff failed
to allege any specific incident of violent prograrming which led to
the desensitization."5 The incitement exception will apply only if a
specific event prompts imminent action.9 3 An effect realized over ten
years is not imminent. 94 Without incitement, the: speech is constitu-
tionally protected, and defendants cannot be judged negligent. 9
The same television intoxication theory alleged in Zamora9"
surfaced again as a defense to murder in State v. Nelson Molina.9 7
85. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
86. Id. at 200.
87. The elements necessary for a cause of action for negligence are:
1. A duty, which is an obligation recognized by law, requiring the actor to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unrea-
sonable risks.
2. A failure to conform to the Standard required. This is commonly called the
breach of duty . . . [It may be said that the defendant was negligent but is not
liable because he was under no duty to the plaintiff not to be ....
Id. at 201 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
150 (5th ed. 1971)).
88. Id. at 200.
89. "The defendants are charged with breaching their duties to plaintiffs by failing to
use ordinary care to prevent Ronny Zamora from being 'impermissibly stimulated, incited and
instigated' to duplicate the atrocities he viewed on television." Id. at 200.
90. Zamora v. C.B.S., 480 F. Supp. 199, 207 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
91. Id. at 202.
92. The plaintiffs never alleged that any one show caused Zamora's violence, nor that he
watched any one network more frequently than the others. Id. at 200. Given the enormous
breadth of the allegations, the court reasoned that to award damages based on 10 years of
network programming would constitute "a restraint on the defendants' exercise of their as-
serted first amendment rights." Id. at 203.
93. Id. at 203.
94. Id.
95. See Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977).
96. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
97. See Dee, supra note 30, at 111 (citing State of Florida v. Nelson Molina, No. 84-
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Molina, however, unlike Zamora, identified a particular media cata-
lyst for the murder, the film "Love at First Bite."98 After watching
the film, Molina, age twenty-one, held down a ten-year-old girl while
her sixteen-year-old brother fatally stabbed and shot her.99 The court
rejected the television intoxication defense as folly and sentenced
Molina and his accomplice to life imprisonment.100
6. Game Manufacturing Liability.-In Watters v. TSR,
Inc., 1 the court refused to hold the manufacturers of the game
"Dungeons and Dragons" liable for the suicide of a devoted player.
Players of "Dungeons and Dragons" assume the roles of imaginary
characters and play out an adventure scenario using the published
materials distributed by TSR. 0 2 Johnny Burnett played the game
regularly for several years.'03 Eventually, he became so absorbed in
the game that he lost touch with reality. 10" His mother claimed he
"lost control of his own independent will and was driven to self-
destruction."10 5
The Kentucky District Court granted summary judgment for
defendants on constitutional grounds by reasoning that games are
speech protected by the First Amendment. 06 Johnny's death oc-
curred after years of exposure to the game, thereby making it impos-
sible for plaintiff to meet the Brandenburg requirement that the
game would in all probability cause immediate injury.10 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed on constitutional as
well as on common law grounds.' 08 Plaintiffs alleged that TSR
breached a duty to warn "mentally fragile persons"' 0 9 such as
2314 B (1lth Judicial Dist., Fla. 1984)).
98. Dee, supra note 30, at 111.
99. Dee, supra note 30, at I 11.
100. "Molina came 200 giant steps closer to linking TV and murder in the sense that
the TV intoxication argument was not immediately thrown out by the judge . . . But is he
susceptible enough to influences from TV to assist in murder? That's poppycock." Dee, supra
note 30, at 111 (citing Molina, No. 84-2314B, at 25). Interestingly, Molina's attorney, Ellis
Rubin, also represented Ronny Zamora.
101. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Watters III.
102. Id. at 379.
103. Id. at 380.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See 715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky. 1989) [hereinafter Watters 1] (lower court ruling
that TSR was constitutionally protected from plaintiff's negligence claim).
107. This finding resembles Zamora because plaintiffs failed to allege any specific act of
incitement that caused the unlawful act. "The basis for not protecting types of speech is not
applicable where the injury does not immediately result from the speech itself. ... Watters
1, 715 F. Supp. at 823.
108. Waiters I1, 904 F. 2d 378, 379 (6th Cir. 1990).
109. Id. at 381.
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Johnny that the game could result in "loss of control of the mental
processes."' 110 This duty is based on the foreseeability of harm.11'
The court rejected this notion, however, and held that "[t]he actual
content of the [game] materials would hardly have given TSR rea-
son to foresee that players of the game would be more susceptible to
murder or suicide than non-players . . . . Dungeons & Dragons is a
'let's pretend' game, not an incitement to do anything more than ex-
ercise the imagination. 1" 2 Defendants had no duty to warn Johnny
of danger because his game-related injury was not foreseeable.' 3
7. Music Liability.-Finally, the case of McCollum v.
C.B.S. 14 contains facts very similar to those in Vance. In McCol-
lum, plaintiffs alleged that Ozzy Osbourne's music proximately
caused the suicide of their son." 5 On October 26, 1984, John Mc-
Collum, who was nineteen years old, listened repeatedly to the Ozzy
Osbourne albums "Blizzard of Oz," "Diary of a Madman," and
"Speak of the Devil.""'  One particular song on the "Blizzard of
Oz" album, entitled "Suicide Solution," concludes that "suicide is
the only way out.""' 7 The song features twenty-eight seconds of
masked lyrics which "are perceptible enough to be heard and under-
stood when the listener concentrates on the music," but are "not im-
mediately intelligible."'"18 The masked lyrics are: "Ah know people/
you really know where its at/ you got it/ why t:ry, why try/ Get the
gun and try it/ Shoot, Shoot, Shoot.""'  While he listened to Os-
bourne's music with headphones on, John McCollum placed a hand-
110. Id.
111. Id. at 382.
112. Id. This negligence analysis partially incorporates the incitement factor. The harm
was not foreseeable because the speech in question did not constitute incitement. Id.
113. Johnny's mother executed an affidavit indicating that she knew of Johnny's intense
interest in the game and of the amount of time he spent playing the game, yet "never, either
before or during the period when he and his friends were immersed in the game, did Johnny
cause his mother any problems. But if Johnny's suicide was not foreseeable to his own mother,
there is no reason to suppose that it was foreseeable to defendant TSR." Waters H1, 904 F.2d
378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990).
114. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
115. Id. at 188.
116. Id. at 189.
117. Id. at 190. "Suicide is slow with liquor . . . The reaper is you, the reaper is me
. . . Made your bed, rest your head/ But you lie there and moan/ where to hide, suicide is the
only way out/ Don't you know what it's really about." Id. at 190 i.S. Based on Osbourne's use
of the first person "you," plaintiffs alleged that Osbourne had a special relationship with his
fans which created a duty of care. Id. at 190. The court rejected this contention, however,
because such a burden would inhibit creative expression. Id. at 197. See also Bill v. Superior
Court of San Francisco, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
118. McCollum v. C.B.S., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
119. Id.
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gun to his head and killed himself.12° The plaintiffs in McCollum
contended that the hidden lyrics and musical rhythms of Osbourne's
music constituted elements of incitement.121
The court disagreed, however, and refused to exempt Os-
bourne's music from the protection of the First Amendment.'22 After
applying the Brandenburg test, the court held that to show incite-
ment, Osbourne's music must have been "directed and intended to-
ward the goal of bringing about the suicide of listeners" and likely to
cause suicide.'22 Because this element of intent did not exist, the
speech was protected and no tort liability resulted. 24
8. Analysis of Media Liability.-All of the aforementioned
cases illustrate that prior to the exception created in Vance, the only
way for a plaintiff to successfully argue the merits of a case against
a media defendant was to satisfy the criteria necessary to prove in-
citement. Moreover, such evidence of incitement had to be so power-
ful as to override the courts' reluctance to impose a duty on the me-
dia for fear of a subsequent chilling effect. Case law illustrates that
the incitement exception has consistently been very narrowly con-
strued for two reasons. First, concern for the preservation of free
speech has led courts to preempt any determination on the merits of
media cases by reaching the threshold determination that defendants
enjoy First Amendment immunity. Second, because incitement can-
not be measured precisely, courts are unwilling to classify cases as
falling within the incitement exception for fear of creating a danger-
ous precedent. To open the door for incitement liability could create
a backlog of frivolous cases and eventually result in media self-cen-
sorship. However, since the court in Vance held that subliminals are
not protected speech, a plaintiff alleging harm caused by subliminal
120. John McCollum was listening to Osbourne's "Speak of the Devil" album and not
the song "Suicide Solution" when he shot himself. Id. at 189. This raises the issue of whether
the specific song that contains the subliminals proximately caused the suicide. Nevertheless,
questions of proximate cause are generally left to the jury.
121. "In addition to the lyrics . . . Osbourne's music utilizes a strong, pounding and
driving rhythm and . . . a 'hemisync' process of sound waves which impact the listener's
mental state." Id. at 191. Plaintiffs alleged that the audible lyrics, masked lyrics and instru-
mental rhythms of the song incited decedent to kill himself. Id.
122. Id. at 195. The subliminal lyrics in the Osbourne song were not specifically consid-
ered, as they were in Vance, and the entire song received First Amendment protection.
123. McCollum v. C.B.S., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). The court cites
Braxton v. Municipal Court, 514 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1973), in support of this proposition. Curi-
ously, Braxton is completely unrelated to liability for incitement of suicide. The case defines
"disrupt" as it applies to incitement of violence on a college campus. Braxton, 514 P.2d at
700.
124. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 198. See also Peter Alan Block, Note, Modern Day
Sirens: Rock Lyrics and the First Amendment, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1990).
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influences can bring suit under a theory of strict products liability
because the cause of action is firmly grounded in existing case law.
Alleging a product liability theory for harm caused by recordings
with subliminal content provides a means to address concerns raised
in media cases previously discussed and also eliminates the require-
ment that plaintiffs prove intent.
III. Elimination of the Intent Requirement
As previously illustrated, media cases must involve unprotected
speech in order for the trier of fact to reach the merits of a case.
Even if unprotected speech is involved, plaintiffs must still establish
a duty of care in negligence cases, 2 ' or show intent in invasion of
privacy cases.' 26 In Vance,127 for example, the court refused to place
liability on C.B.S. for invasion of privacy caused by unintentional
subliminals.' 28 The court held that "[t]he defendants are not liable
in this action for subliminal commands which were inadvertently
formed. For liability to exist for this type of activity there must be a
showing of a clear, conscious and intentional act on the part of de-
fendants."'129 Under a products liability theory, however, a showing
of intent is not required.
IV. Criteria for Establishing a Design Defect
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A) provides that a
plaintiff can recover damages against a seller of a product for physi-
cal harm caused by the product upon a showing that: (1) the seller is
"in the business of selling such a product," (2) the product reaches
the consumer in the same condition in which it is sold, and (3) the
product is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."' 30 The
125. See PROSSER, supra note 87.
126. See PROSSER, supra note 17.
127. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-3939 (2d Judicial Dist., Nev., Washoe
County Aug. 24, 1990).
128. Id. at 21.
129. Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) 1965 states:
§ 402(a) Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it. is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
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first two prongs of this test are not at issue because a record manu-
facturer is clearly in the business of selling records, and record al-
bums with subliminals reach the consumer in an unchanged condi-
tion. This section examines the third prong-whether the product is
defective and unreasonably dangerous based on the existence of a
design defect. 1 ' Courts have applied three tests to assess product
defects: constructive knowledge, 8 2 consumer expectation, 38 and util-
ity/risk.'34
A. The Constructive Knowledge Test
Under a constructive knowledge test, liability in tort is deter-
mined by a negligence standard. 385 According to Professor Wade,
this test is applied by assuming "that the defendant knew of the dan-
gerous condition of the product and ask whether he was then negli-
gent in putting it on the market or supplying it to someone else."' 36
In Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 37 a forklift injured the
plaintiff because it lacked a seat or platform for the operator.3 8 The
court listed several policy reasons why the constructive knowledge
test is advantageous in establishing liability. 9 First, by employing a
negligence standard, it rewards the careful manufacturer and en-
courages the design of safer products.4 0 Second, the ramifications to
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
131. The first case to establish a cause of action for strict liability, wholly separate from
the Uniform Commercial Code, was Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963). The case held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. This case preceded the enactment of
Section 402(a) by two years. See also Page Keeton, Product Liability And the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973).
132. See Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
133. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973).
134. "The test ... is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article know-
ing of the risk involved." Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036.
135. Wade, supra note 133, at 834-35. Wade continues to advocate a negligence analy-
sis that employs a utility/risk test. This comment discusses consumer expectation and utility/
risk as two separate tests for defects.
136. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978) (setting forth
standard that a product is defective if a manufacturer who had actual knowledge of the danger
would not have placed it on the market.). See also Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d
1033 (Or. 1974).
137. 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 185.
140. Id.
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the manufacturer on a finding of a design defect can be financially
devastating, often requiring the nullification of an entire product
line.1 ' Thus, the higher threshold of liability implicit in a negligence
standard helps to assure that a product will not be arbitrarily
deemed defective. 142 Finally, use of a fault standard brings greater
intrinsic fairness because a careful manufacturer will reap the bene-
fits of lower insurance premiums and fewer lawsuits.1
43
B. The Consumer Expectation Test
A second test for design defect is the consumer contemplation
or consumer expectation test. Under section 402(a) of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, a product is defectively dangerous if it is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to the product's characteris-
tics.' ' 4 4 Thus, a product is defective if it fails to perform in a man-
ner reasonably expected by the user."'5 This test has faced criticism
for being too vague, thereby making it possible to conclude that any
harmful result of the product's design was beyond the consumer's
expectation." 6
C. The Utility/Risk Analysis
Wade's utility/risk test for product defects balances the risk of
harm with the usefulness of the product in its present condition. 47
As with each of the product defect tests, the plaintiff bears the ulti-
mate burden of proving a product's defectiveness."4 Wade listed
seven factors to be considered when deciding whether a product's
usefulness outweighs its potential harm."19 These factors examine
safety aspects, manufacturers' ability to eliminate the risk, and gen-
141. Id.
142. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Mich. 1984).
143. Id.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) comment i (1965).
145. See Miller v. Dvornik, 501 N.E.2d 160, 165 (11. App. Ct. 1986) (A motorcycle
could not be deemed unreasonably dangerous if it performed in a manner reasonably expected
given its nature.).
146. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 558 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1977) (wherein the court criticized a
jury determination that automobile glass which shattered was defective based on a consumer
expectation test). The court criticized the test as undesirable because it was too close to the
"reasonable man" standard common in negligence cases. Id. at 513. See also Paul D. Rhe-
ingold, What Are the Consumer's Reasonable Expectations?, 22 Bus. LAW 589 (1967).
147. Wade, supra note 133.
148. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 99 (1984).
149. Wade, supra note 133, at 837.
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eral community awareness of the potential danger of the product. 150
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,51
applied the utility/risk test to a situation in which the plaintiff dove
into a pool that was too shallow." 2 Plaintiff contended that the pool
was defective because of the slippery vinyl-lined pool bottom. 53 Af-
ter it considered the claim, the court held that "risk-utility analysis
is appropriate when the product may function satisfactorily under
one set of circumstances, yet because of its design present undue risk
of injury to the user in another situation.' 54 In other words, this
type of analysis is advantageous because it is flexible. It is applicable
in situations where the product is only dangerous to a limited num-
ber of users under very limited circumstances. Because this is the
case with hidden record messages, the utility/risk analysis will ap-
ply. This is contrary to the consumer expectation test's examination
of potential harm to the "reasonable" user. A utility/risk analysis
allows for recovery by a plaintiff who may fail to act reasonably with
regard to the product. When the risks of a product are so grave as to
outweigh the benefits associated with the product, plaintiff has
demonstrated a design defect.1
55
150. Wade's factors are as follows:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the products - its utility to the user and
to the public as a whole. "
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition
of the product, or the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss .by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 133, at 837-38.
151. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 298.
154. Id. at 304.
155. Occasionally a product will meet the criteria for a design defect under these tests,
yet the court will hold that the hazard was so open and obvious that the product is not unrea-
sonably dangerous. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979). See contra
Meyer v. Gehl Co., 329 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). But see Annotation, Products
Liability: Duty of Manufacturers to Equip Product with Safety Device to Protect Against
Patent or Obvious Danger, 95 A.L.R. 3d 1066 (1990).
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V. Application of Tests to Subliminal Song Lyrics
A. Feasibility of Applying Products Liability Tests to Speech
To date, strict liability in tort has never been extended to ele-
ments of speech.156 Prior to Vance, speech was excepted from consti-
tutional protection solely based on its content. To determine whether
speech is obscenity, 5 ' fighting words, 15 s defamation 59 or incite-
ment,1 60 a court must examine the substance of the message and its
context. Subliminals are classified completely differently. A court
can classify speech as subliminal solely based on technology without
analyzing its content. 6 ' To use Marshall McLuhan's terms, the sub-
liminals are related to the medium and not to the message. 162 A
court can establish liability for subliminals based on how records are
designed or produced - making it feasible to test this type of
"speech" as a defective product.
1. The Constructive Knowledge Test.--The constructive
knowledge test, as applied to subliminal messages, poses the question
of whether a manufacturer would be negligent in. distributing an al-
bum knowing that the subliminal message could induce a vulnerable
listener to take his or her own life. In Fuller v. Preis,"s3 the court
held that "suicide, as a matter of law, is not a superseding cause in
negligence law precluding liability.' 64 In Fuller, the decedent com-
mitted suicide seven months after suffering injuries in an automobile
collision. 6 5 The decedent believed he was not injured by the acci-
dent, but he actually suffered head injuries that resulted in seizures
and the irresistible impulse to kill himself. 66 The specific issue
before the court was whether the negligent driver of the vehicle that
156. See Watters II, 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990). "Liability without fault, or 'strict
liability' may sometimes attach where an injury is caused by an inherently dangerous product.
As far as we have been able to ascertain, however, the doctrine of strict liability has never
been extended to words or pictures." Id. at 381.
157. See cases cited supra note 22.
158. See supra note 23.
159. See supra note 24.
160. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
161. Telephone interview with Victoria Evans, plaintiff's witness in Vance (September
26, 1990). Ms. Evans used a computer to isolate the subliminal sounds on the "Stained Class"
album.
162. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
163. Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1974).
164. Id. at 265.
165. Id. at 266.
166. Id. See also Padula v. State, 398 N.E.2d 548 (N.Y. 1979) (Drug rehabilitation
patient who committed suicide could not resist impulse to consume methyl alcohol mixed with
Tang.).
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struck the decedent could be held tortiously liable for the suicide. 1 7
The court held that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to withstand
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. 8 Thus, in a situation
involving suicide, a defendant can be held responsible because of a
negligent action that prompts the suicide.
It could be argued that the decedents in Vance were unable to
resist the irresistible impulse to commit suicide due to C.B.S.'s "neg-
ligent" act of releasing a record album containing subliminal
messages. Under Fuller, C.B.S. could be held tortiously liable for
the suicides if it had known of the prior inclusion of the dangerous
command "Do it" on the "Stained Class" album. When constructive
knowledge of the danger is imposed on C.B.S., the prerequisites for a
product defect have been met.6 9 The release of the defective record
album constitutes negligent distribution.
2. The Consumer Expectation Test.-The consumer expecta-
tion test is quite simple in its application to subliminal messages in
song lyrics. A consumer purchases a record album with the expecta-
tion of listening to audible lyrics and music. The relationship of the
record to the listener is presumed to be passive. However, a record
containing subliminal messages fails to meet these expectations be-
cause it contains (lyrics that are not consciously audible, but could
stimulate the listener to respond .'7  The record is not as passive as a
listener expects.
Although research on the effectiveness of subliminal suggestions
has not yet yielded conclusive findings, it is generally accepted that
individuals are capable of receiving subliminal messages and will un-
consciously process and react to such stimuli. 17 The effectiveness of
the subliminal message may depend on the emotional state of the
listener, with positive subliminal content more readily accepted than
negative subliminal content. 72 If a listener is tormented about
whether to commit suicide, song lyrics which subliminally encourage
suicide may be readily accepted because of the listener's mindset.' 8
167. Fuller, 322 N.E.2d at 264.
168. Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d 263, 264 (N.Y. 1974).
169. The ultimate question of whether a product is defective is often decided by a jury.
This comment only addresses whether plaintiffs should be accorded a trial on the merits re-
garding a potential product defect. It does not cover issues which, by their nature, must be
weighed and evaluated by a trier of fact.
170. See WILSON BRYAN KaY, MEDIA SEXPLOITATION (1977). See also WILSON BRYAN
KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION (1974).
171. Goodkin, supra note 14, at 1089-91.
172. Goodkin, supra note 14, at 1090.
173. In Vance, plaintiff's primary witness, Dr. Howard Shevrin, testified that "the sub-
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These masked lyrics can trigger an emotional reaction which is very
powerful to one who is in conflict about whether or not to take ac-
tion.174 This potential to spur a listener to action renders a record
album more dangerous than would be conceived by the average pur-
chaser. Hence, a consumer expectation test may classify the presence
of subliminal messages as a product defect.
3. The Utility/Risk Test.-Under the utility/risk test, the use-
fulness and desirability of record albums with subliminal lyrics must
be weighed against the potential harm caused by the subliminal
lyrics. 175 One of Wade's factors, the "availability of a substitute
product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe," is
particularly applicable here.176 Records without subliminals are not
consciously distinguishable from those containing subliminals. Thus,
records without masked lyrics could readily be substituted for their
counterparts containing subliminal messages without sacrificing con-
sumer needs. Because the subliminal component is not perceptible,
the elimination of this component would have virtually no effect on
the product's utility.
Another Wade factor, the listener's ability to exercise reasona-
ble care to avoid the danger, is applicable to a finding of product
defect for two reasons..77 First, because listener. cannot detect the
existence of subliminal messages, they are unable to exercise reason-
able care in avoiding them. Second, this factor considers the question
of whether the consumer assumed the risk of the danger through his
or her conduct. This defense is not available to a manufacturer who
produces records containing subliminal lyrics because the assumption
of risk requires a showing that plaintiffs consciously chose to expose
themselves to the danger. 78 Victims of subliminal manipulation,
having no knowledge of the existence of the message, cannot have
voluntarily exposed themselves to such a message - especially be-
cause subliminal lyrics are not included on record liner notes with
audible lyrics.
Moreover, in light of their concealment, it can be argued that
liminal command 'Do It' created a compulsion towards doing that which James and Raymond
were already predisposed to do, to commit suicide." Vance v. JudEs Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-
3939, at 23-25 (2d Judicial Dist., Nev., Washoe County August 24, 1990).
174. Telephone interview with Vivian Lynch, plaintiff's attorney in Vance v. Judas
Priest (Sept. 19, 1990).
175. See Wade, supra note 133, at 837.
176. See Wade, supra note 133, at 837.
177. See Wade, supra note 133, at 837.
178. See Hildebrand v. Minyard, 494 P.2d 1328 (Ariz. App. 1972) (holding that plain-
tiff must appreciate the magnitude of the risk in order to have assumed it).
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subliminal song lyrics have absolutely no utility. This in itself, how-
ever, is insufficient to classify subliminals as product defects. For ex-
ample, plaintiffs in Patterson v. Gesellscaft171 were unable to demon-
strate that handguns were defective despite the fact that "the risks
of injury and death that accompany handguns greatly outweigh any
utility they may have." 180 The court in Patterson held that "Satur-
day Night Special" handguns were not defective because they per-
formed exactly as intended. 8' The weapons only caused injury when
they were misused.'82
Handguns are distinguishable from subliminal song lyrics, how-
ever, because gun users generally realize the danger inherent in fire-
arms. Teenagers who listen to albums such as "Stained Class," on
the other hand, are unaware of the presence or dangers of subliminal
lyrics. However, the court's ability to fashion a remedy in tort for
misuse is limited because handgun control has been deemed an issue
for legislative and not judicial control. 183 Record albums, though, are
not enmeshed in the political arena, and courts have a free hand in
permitting recovery under products liability. Thus, under a utility/
risk analysis, the risks associated with subliminal record lyrics out-
weigh any useful functions served.
When courts impose liability on media defendants who dissemi-
nate subliminal messages, they do not threaten free speech by en-
couraging self-censorship by the media. Audible speech will continue
to merit constitutional protection, and no parochial evaluation of rec-
ord content will affect a court's decision of whether to condemn a
record as defective.
Heavy metal albums are specifically marketed toward young
people, those most vulnerable to subliminal stimulation.1 84 Record
manufacturers should not enjoy absolute immunity from liability
when they inject potentially dangerous subliminal messages into
their products. Listeners have no defense against these messages -
not even a conscious mind. Because of the decision in Vance, those
who suffer the consequences of hidden messages will have an oppor-
tunity to have their cases decided on the merits.
Under each of the three tests discussed, it is possible to charac-
179. 608 F. Supp. 1206 (D.C. Tex. 1985).




184. Telephone interview with Vivian Lynch, attorney for James Vance (September 19,
1990).
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terize subliminal song lyrics as product defects under strict liability
in tort. There is no case law on point, because previously all song
lyrics were considered protected speech under the First Amendment.
Because Vance held that subliminal song lyrics were unprotected
speech, there is now room to examine these elements of speech in
terms of product defects, much in the same way as previous courts
have examined lawnmowers185 and forklifts.186
VI. Conclusion
But, you know, I see you smiling a lot, you know, and it just me
- I don't know if I'm saying what you need to hear, but he is
dead. I'm mangled. We took the music very serious. We fol-
lowed it to the line and we did various things under the influence
of the music as a -. The music has as much power as a drug or
alcohol. The more you had, you know - The music was like a
drug or alcohol. And it was an addiction. Sometimes if you take
a drink you will get nauseated and sometimes you will take and
drink and you will feel fine and be able to drink all night and
the music was like that . . . It was like almost: spontaneously
right afterwards. It was a real burst of power.181
The influence of heavy metal music definitely affected James
and Raymond. It gave them a feeling of power, but also a feeling of
desperation which the plaintiffs allege drove them to destroy
themselves.
Victims of subliminal messages have a right to a fighting chance
against record companies - but can society really pin the cause of
suicide on a record company? A plaintiff should have a right to try
to convince a jury that a record proximately caused the self-
destruction.
In many cases, like Vance, however, to say that the suicide pro-
cess began with heavy metal music is a gross oversimplification of a
societal problem. Maybe the suicide process really began when
young James and Raymond first suffered the physical abuse, drug
185. See Foglio v. Western Auto Supply, 128 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). See
generally Annotation, Products Liability: Strict Liability in Tort, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057 (1990).
186. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 523 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Conder v. Hull Lift
Truck, 435 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. 1982); Deem v. Woodbine Mfg. Co., 546 P.2d 1207 (N.M. 1976);
Foley v. Clark Equip. Co. and Indus. Lift Co., 523 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. 1987). See generally
Annotations, Products Liability: Forklift Trucks, 95 A.L.R. 3d 54). (1990).
187. Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844, 86-3939, at 38 (2d Judicial Dist., Nev.,
Washoe County August 24, 1990).
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abuse and alcohol abuse that eventually made them so vulnerable
that they acted on a hidden suicide prompt.
In the Judas Priest lawsuit, it's easy to see how kids get the idea
that they are not responsible for their actions . . . Heavy metal
made them do it - not the revolving fathers, the beatings, the
alcohol, the drugs, a failure of will or of nurturing. Someone's to
blame. Someone else. Always someone else.188
Laura A. Lyon
188. Anna Quindlen, Public & Private; Suicide Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1990, at
21.

